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Water crises present a global water governance challenge. To date, scholarship has tended to focus on 
technological and policy-based solutions, while ignoring the influence of narratives on public buy-in during 
such crises. Africa is expected to become hotter and drier in future, while its cities experience high levels 
of informal population growth and inequality. These factors combine to make African cities particularly 
vulnerable to times of water stress. The aim in this paper is to investigate the state of the 'art' on narratives 
framing domestic water use in African cities during periods of acute water stress and 'crises', using a systematic 
literature review of peer-reviewed academic journal articles. The findings revealed a small population of 
recently published papers that engage critically with state-generated narratives framing the crisis, limited 
to case studies on Cape Town and Windhoek. We recommend, however, a greater critical engagement with 
the anti-establishment narratives that can flourish during periods of acute water stress, and tend to be 
inflammatory and divisive in nature.
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INTRODUCTION
Periods of acute water stress (often referred to as ‘crises’) are a global risk to society (World Economic 
Forum, 2019) because they undermine trust in water authorities, providing a window of opportunity 
for opposition groups to challenge and redefine structures of governance (Godinez et al., 2019; Rubin, 
2010). Acute water stress periods tend to engender conflict in population-dense, unequal, segmented 
societies with competing water use sectors (Christian et al., 2017). Regional and local politics are also 
influential, as opposition leaders and dissident groups can politicise water crises, drawing on familiar 
framings such as inequality and injustice (Tempelhoff, 2015; Rubin, 2010). Such characteristics are 
commonplace in many African cities (Christian et al. 2017), as well as high informal population 
growth and inadequate water infrastructure (Dos Santos et al., 2017).
Scholarship on water governance focuses overwhelmingly on policy- and technology-driven 
approaches, while less attention has been paid to the narratives framing water governance, which 
influence public buy-in to – and therefore the impact of – such policies and technology (Godinez et 
al., 2019; Hurlimann and Dolnicar, 2012). The framings of notions of ‘crises’ and ‘scarcity’ also need 
careful interrogation (Kaika, 2003; Mehta, 2005, 2010). Mehta (2003, 2005, 2010) argues that water 
scarcity is not only a natural phenomenon driven, for example, by periods of acute drought but is also 
the product of the social and power relations that shape water practices, use and water access. Cape 
Town’s 2016–2018 ‘water crisis’ is a case in point: The City of Cape Town’s Water Conservation and 
Demand Management Programme won first prize at the C40 Cities Awards 2015 (C40 Cities, 2019 – a 
largely cities-based network with mayoral support and funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies amongst 
others), but in the three years that followed, public trust in local water governance disintegrated, as 
reflected in the ‘outpouring of alarmist and distrustful articles in the media’ (Gosling, 2018). Thus, 
the ‘communication, negotiation, conflict [and] rhetoric’ (Gergen, 1985 p. 268) in narratives framing 
water governance may undermine trust in water authorities, notwithstanding sound policies and 
technology (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016; Hurlimann and Dolnicar, 2012).
Much of the narrative analysis applied to water governance focuses on the relationship between 
state legitimacy and its provision of basic services. For example, Mehta (2003), on Indian bulk water 
infrastructure, highlights the state’s construction of scarcity to justify profiteering water projects. 
While exposing hegemonic water narratives, this perspective ignores the considerable power 
vested in (segments of) society to challenge the dominant discourse. This power is better addressed 
by Rodina and Harris (2016) on Cape Town, who similarly highlight the correlation between 
perceptions of state legitimacy and service provision, and the potential for political engagement by 
previously disenfranchised. These papers study the impact of structural inequalities on perceptions 
of the legitimacy of water authorities.
Other research shows, however, that the undermining of state legitimacy may be engineered through 
the construction of polemic, exaggerated or distorted narrative framings. For example, Hurlimann and 
Dolnicar (2012), through a content analysis of newspapers published during an episode of drought 
in Australia, indicate that media framings of acute water stress may influence public buy-in, and 
thereby impact on the efficacy of crisis-mitigating policies and infrastructure. Similarly, Kaika (2003) 
investigated the drought in Athens between 1989 and 1991 and addresses the intensity – violence even 
– of the narratives that occured during the throes of this crisis. In Kaika’s (2003) case study, dissidents 
framed water as natural and a human right, in order to delegitimise usage tariffs and water demand 
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management. ‘Crisis’ episodes, such as acute water stress, appear 
to provide opportunities for the contestation of narrative framings, 
with an outcome being the fragmentation of society and the loss of 
public buy-in to official crisis mitigation strategies.
Narrative is a tool to create a frame of an event. In the same way 
that a photographer frames their shot by choosing which details 
to include or exclude, so a narrator uses a narrative to ‘frame’ 
an event in order to communicate a particular perspective to an 
audience (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2013; Fløttum and Gjerstad, 
2016). A useful conceptualisation of the political contestation 
of narrative framings is found in the 2017 Kenyan elections 
(Maweu, 2017). In this case, ‘weaponised narratives’ (Hendricks 
and Verstergaard, 2019) were created ‘to subvert and undermine 
[…] institutions, identity, and civilization […] by sowing and 
exacerbating complexity, confusion, and political and social 
schisms’ (Allenby, 2017 p. 66). Thus, while scholarship on water 
crisis communication has tended to focus on government’s 
use of narratives to consolidate power (cf. Kaika, 2003; Mehta, 
2003, 2005, 2010), more attention needs to be given to the 
influence of narrative contestation on public perceptions of water 
governance during times of acute water stress in the African 
context. Throughout the present paper, ‘public’ refers to citizens, 
while ‘government’ refers to the state, typically the state’s water 
authorities. These terms are interrogated in more detail in the 
results section of this paper.
In this paper, we adopt a systematic review to establish the contours 
of the scholarship on narratives framing domestic water use in 
African cities during water crises. We find that the population 
of papers on this subject is extremely limited and small (n = 5), 
and, with the exception of one paper from Windhoek, this field 
of inquiry only really emerged following Cape Town’s 2016–2018 
‘water crisis’. Based on a narrative analysis of these papers, we 
show that these publications tend to frame water crisis narratives 
in terms of a government-versus-population perspective, and 
present the media as the mouthpiece of either actor in a battle to 
control the dominant narrative. Our conclusion is thus twofold: 
(i) a broader array of case-studies on this subject is needed that 
represents cities from other African countries, in order to create 
a more nuanced perspective on this subject, and (ii) a more 
nuanced conceptual framing is required of the actors involved to 
avoid stereotyping ‘the state’, ‘the public’ and ‘the media’ as unified 
entities at enmity with each other.
METHODS
On 7 May 2019, we searched the following databases: Directory 
of Open Access Journals, EBSCOhost, JSTOR, ProQuest, Sabinet, 
SAGE, Science Direct, Scopus, Springer Link, Taylor and Francis 
and Web of Science. The following search criteria were adopted: 
all in title: (water OR IWRM OR rain OR drought OR climate 
OR natural)) AND (full text: Africa AND (crisis OR crises 
OR scarcity OR shortage OR conflict) AND (governance OR 
government OR political) AND (narrative OR discourse)). We 
chose not to limit the search to synonyms of ‘domestic water use’ 
at this stage because of the variety of such synonyms. The selection 
for papers on domestic water use was rather done manually, as 
indicated in the following section. No parameters were set for the 
publication date. All citations were exported to EPPI Reviewer 4 
for processing.
We screened 4 281 titles and abstracts after removing 1 544 
duplicate items. Articles qualifying for inclusion described 
empirical research on narratives framing domestic water supply 
during water crises in Africa. Excluded articles were therefore: 
not in English (n = 5); not empirical research (n = 314); not on 
domestic water use (n = 1 643); not on an African country (n = 
1 199); not on human subjects (n = 622); and on behaviour only, 
not narratives (n = 353). Of the remaining articles that mentioned 
narratives (n = 145), 80 were on gender roles, 22 were on rituals and 
hygiene, 20 on legal frameworks of water access, 9 on water supply 
projects, 8 on water demand management technologies, and 6 on 
water crises, of which one was set in colonial-era Algeria, and 
so was excluded. Thus, only 5 peer-reviewed papers were found 
that conduct empirical research on narratives framing domestic 
water supply during ‘water crises’ in Africa (Table 1). It is worth 
noting that 4 of these 5 papers represented a portion of the flurry 
of research articles on Cape Town’s water crisis that emerged from 
2017 onwards. The majority of these were, however, excluded by 
the selection criteria for this review as they were drought review 
papers (e.g. Muller, 2018; Olivier and Xu, 2019; Vogel and Olivier, 
2018), news or opinion pieces (Harris et al., 2018), or they did not 
analyse narratives on domestic water use (e.g. Madonsela et al., 
2019; Visser, 2018; Wolski, 2018).
A narrative analysis was adopted for coding, analysing and 
interpreting data from the full text of the five papers presented in 
Table 1, in order to provide a framework for exposing rhetorical 
Table 1. Final selection of peer-reviewed papers that conducted empirical research on narratives framing domestic water supply during water 
crises in Africa









Drought, flooding, South Africa, 




2019 Climate change adaptation and local 
government: Institutional complexities 
surrounding Cape Town’s Day Zero
Journal of Disaster Risk 
Studies
Climate Change, Day Zero, Water, 
Municipalities, SDGs
Robins 2019 'Day Zero', hydraulic citizenship and the 
defence of the commons in Cape Town: 
A case study of the politics of water and 
its infrastructures
Journal of Southern African 
Studies
Water, citizenship, activism, the 
commons, commodification
Scott et al. 2018 The story of water in Windhoek: A 
narrative approach to interpreting a 
transdisciplinary process
Water Transdisciplinary, water, narrative, 
Windhoek, co-production, 
participatory
Visser 2018 A perfect storm: The ramifications of 
Cape Town’s drought crisis
The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research 
in Southern Africa
Cape Town, drought, ‘Day Zero’, water 
restrictions, political fall-out, water 
demand strategy
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devices in a seemingly dispassionate text (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 
2016). Our application of narrative analysis is situated in the 
broader theoretical framework of social constructionism, which 
argues that public perception, knowledge or beliefs are not a 
‘reflection or map of the world’, but are social artifacts (Gergen, 
1985 p. 266). Narrative analysis is the process of deconstructing 
the narratives framing such perceptions to expose and interrogate 
the rhetorical devices in the ‘stories’ of the subtext that frame an 
event (in our case, water crises) (Fløttum and Dahl, 2012).
Narrative analysis emerged with the work of Vladimir Propp 
on Russian folklore (1958), upon which Adam (2008) based his 
typology of narrative sequence, which may be applicable to an 
interpretation of all texts, particularly those that are not overtly 
framed as stories, for example, such as policy documents or 
academic articles (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016). This typology 
identifies characters and the role they play in the plotline of the 
‘story’ (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016). Adam’s (2008) typology 
is interpreted through the extensive work of Fløttum and Dahl 
(2012), Fløttum and Gjerstad (2013) and Fløttum and Gjerstad 
(2016), who apply narrative analysis to policy documents to 
expose the rhetorical devices that contribute to the persuasive 
power of a text for framing moral responsibilities, defining 
problems, indicating causes and promoting solutions, but through 
their concealment in the subtext, are more likely to evade the 
critical engagement (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016).
The value of narrative analysis for the purpose of the present study 
is illustrated in its application to the proceedings of a workshop 
of water experts discussing Windhoek’s 2015–2017 water crisis 
(Scott et al., 2018) and climate policy documents (Fløttum and 
Gjerstad, 2013; Fløttum and Dahl, 2012). In these applications 
of narrative analysis, the characters are broadly categorised as 
heroes, villains and victims (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016). We will 
be adopting this typology in our analysis of academic papers in 
the present study.
Every instance in the five papers presented in Table 1 in which any 
character is quoted or paraphrased by the authors for all public 
communications during the water crisis were selected and coded 
in EPPI Reviewer 4. In qualitative data analysis, this method is 
referred to as ‘indexing’, or ‘code-and-retrieve’ (Elliott, 2018). 
Broadly speaking, three types of characters (the state, the public 
and the media) appear in all four of the papers, whereas minor 
types of characters (experts, businesses, farmers and NGOs) are 
only present in some of the papers. The present study focuses on 
the narratives of the state, the public and the media, as portrayed 
in the texts under analysis.
The five papers in Table 1 differ in some respects, particularly 
in terms of their structure, discipline and depth of focus. For 
example, Robins (2019), being an ethnographic study, is the 
most in-depth, using the behaviour of an individual to interpret 
issues of justice in Cape Town’s water governance. Conversely, 
Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019), for example, adopt a high-level 
framing in the context of South Africa’s water policy environment. 
Nevertheless, our selection criteria ensured that the reviewed 
texts shared important commonalities, namely: they are all from 
science journals and all are based on empirical research of a 
specific case of drought in an African city. The selected papers 
therefore appear to share sufficient commonalities to be analysed 
together for the purposes of the present study. While a population 
of five papers is relatively small for a field of research (and this 
dearth is a key finding of the systematic review), it is a relatively 
large number of texts to include in a single narrative analysis, 
relative to the narrative analyses cited in the present study. Our 
intention, in analysing all five papers and drawing comparisons 
between them (as well as discussing them in light of the existing 
conceptual and contextual papers cited in the present study), is to 
increase the validity and generalisability of the findings beyond 
what may have been possible in an analysis of one of these texts, 
or a comparison of two.
The following results section begins by broadly outlining the 
context in which the papers are placed, namely the Cape Town 
and Windhoek droughts, respectively, before engaging with the 
three main characters as they are portrayed by the texts under 
analysis. Each section on the state, the public and the media tracks 
the evolution of each character over the course of the story. As 
elaborated in the discussion section thereafter, the subsection 
titles, namely: The State, The Public and The Media are deliberate 
stereotypes or generalisations, reflecting how they tend to be 
presented in the papers under analysis, as well as by the broader 
literature on water crisis narratives (cf. Mehta, 2003). For this 
reason, in keeping with existing conventions for narrative analysis 
(cf. Scott et al., 2018), we provide a page number for paraphrases 
as well as for direct quotes, in order to indicate the specific location 
of the sequence of text being referred to.
RESULTS
The contexts
In a population of over 4 000 papers from academic databases, our 
systematic review indicated that only five peer-reviewed papers 
conducted empirical research on narratives framing domestic 
water supply during water crises in Africa in the post-colonial 
era. Four of these, Visser (2018), Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019), 
Nhamo and Agyepong (2019) and Robins (2019), address Cape 
Town’s 2016–2018 water crisis, while Scott et al. (2018) address 
Windhoek’s 2015–2017 water crisis. Both crises stimulated complex 
political and social conflicts, and manifold social, political and 
meteorological events either exacerbated or mitigated these crises 
– key aspects of which are described in more depth over the course 
of this results section. At the risk of oversimplifying these complex 
phenomena, the following paragraphs present a brief synopsis of 
each crisis in order to give the reader a simple timeline through 
which to make sense of the more in-depth analysis that follows.
Cape Town’s water crisis began with the enforcement of residential 
water use restrictions in January 2016, following a low winter 
rainfall (Visser, 2018). The subsequent two winters experienced 
record-breaking low rainfalls. A countdown to the city’s water 
supply being shut off began, labelled ‘Day Zero’ (Enqvist 
and Ziervogel, 2019). Although the supply system reached 
unprecedented low levels, the winter rains in 2018 sufficiently 
replenished the supply dams to negate the Day Zero countdown, 
thereby ending the crisis (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019).
Windhoek’s water crisis spanned 2015 to 2017. The low rainfall 
over this time necessitated water demand management, a water 
saving campaign and the planning of an aquifer recharge scheme. 
This scheme was however postponed while the city waited for 
national government to release the funds. Funding for the scheme 
was released just in time before the city’s water ran out, by the end 
of 2016, ending the crisis (Scott et al., 2018).
The state
The presentation of public authorities in the five papers 
begins with a reductionist framing of the state as utilitarian: 
emotionless – almost mechanical – going about governance. In 
this characterisation, the public are passive recipients of the state’s 
narrative. Stolid verbs such as ‘declared’, ‘announced’, ‘proposed’ 
and ‘published’ abound to describe the state’s communication of, 
for example, restrictions, water-saving tips, additional levies, and 
other practical communications (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 8; 
Nhamo and Agyepong, 2019 p. 2; Robins, 2019 p. 3; Scott et al., 
2018 p. 9; Visser, 2018 p. 3).
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This utilitarian framing of the state evolves however as the crisis 
deepens; the state’s limitations begin to emerge as the narrative 
progresses. Such limitations may include the failure to win 
public support due to inadequate self-promotion or the use of 
inappropriate communication media, such as websites in English, 
when a significant proportion of the population do not have 
access to computers and are not native English speakers (Enqvist 
and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 10). Even the state’s own awareness of 
its limitations is expressed through misgivings about anarchy, 
epidemics and violent conflict, grimly predicting that ‘Day 
Zero’ crisis may ‘exceed anything a major city has had to face 
anywhere in the world since the Second World War or 9/11’ 
(Robins, 2019 p. 10).
Dysfunctional communication is also described within 
government: either within a tier of government (municipal or 
local, provincial and national) or between tiers, as blame-shifting 
and in-fighting (Nhamo and Agyepong, 2019 p. 5; Robins, 
2019 p. 17). Both the Namibian and South African cases cite 
communications that indicate dislocation between government 
tiers; particularly between local and national government 
(Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 7; Nhamo and Agyepong, 2019 
p. 7; Scott et al., 2018 p. 8, 9, 12; Visser, 2018 p. 5). Local government 
is portrayed as actively involved in crisis mitigation by all of the 
articles in this review, while national government, though rarely 
featured, is typically characterised as shirking its responsibilities, 
such as routine maintenance or infrastructure upgrades (Enqvist 
and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 11; Scott et al. 2018 p. 8, 11). In Nhamo and 
Agyepong (2019 p. 7), national government accuses their political 
opponents ruling Cape Town municipality and the province it is 
in of mismanaging the crisis. Visser (2018 p. 5), however, records 
dissonance between local and provincial government, namely 
provincial government’s objection to a drought levy proposed 
by the municipality, even though both tiers are run by the same 
political party. The same party’s national leader also reports 
deciding to take control of local governance of the crisis, being 
‘not fully satisfied’ with the performance of the mayor (Visser 
2018 p. 5). Visser’s (2018) paper ends with the state characterised 
as dysfunctional. The remaining four papers also characterise the 
state in this way, but continue to evolve this character.
A characterisation that follows that of the dysfunctional state is 
the harried state, as the state’s narratives change from belligerence 
to despair. For example, in the Namibian case, this despair is 
framed as resulting from the state feeling overwhelmed by the 
forces of nature. Scott et al. (2018) frequently apply the adjective 
‘vulnerable’ at this stage of the paper when describing how local 
government frames itself: vulnerability to extreme weather, 
climate change and drought (Scott et al., 2018 p. 8, 11). This 
vulnerability ends however with the injection of funding from 
national government for an aquifer recharge scheme. Scott et al.’s 
(2018 p. 11) characterisation of the state therefore concludes with 
the state exonerated.
By contrast, Enqvist and Ziervogel’s (2019) paper concludes with 
Cape Town’s government framing itself as vulnerable and harried. 
The City’s Disaster Plan notes the difficulty of communicating 
‘the seriousness of the situation while avoiding a sense of panic’ 
(Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 10), and the mayor laments, 
‘a majority of people do not seem to care’ about saving water 
(Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 8).
Nhamo and Agyepong (2019 p. 8), having published the latest of 
all of the papers here reviewed, conclude their narrative with the 
announcement of the ‘defeat’ of Day Zero. Notwithstanding this 
victory, the paper’s findings end with a description of criminal 
charges and investigations instigated against Cape Town’s ruling 
party by dissident civil society organisations (Nhamo and 
Agyepong, 2019 p. 8).
Robins (2019) alone continues evolving the state’s character from 
petulant to becoming manipulative and forceful. Robins (2019 
p. 11), for example, relates how the state has been tricking low-
income households into installing water management devices that 
throttle their water flow in exchange for free leak repairs. Thus, 
the true character of the state comes to light as its narrative moves 
from playing the victim to ‘cajoling, blaming and shaming’ the 
public in more overt efforts to control their behaviour (Robins, 
2019 p. 14).
Robins (2019) uses conflict over access to a natural spring in a 
Cape Town suburb as a microcosm of the broader inequalities 
that the water crisis exposed in Cape Town society. Robins’ 
paper culminates in the shutting-down of the spring, framed 
as a travesty of justice to and loss of democratic representation 
by disenfranchised segments of society (although the spring 
was not really ‘closed’, it was merely piped a few meters farther, 
to a more accessible parking lot) (Robins 2019 p. 21–22). In the 
paper’s introduction, Robins (2019 p. 8) summarises the paper, 
describing its conclusion being that fulsome politicians wooed 
those they punished with congratulations, as ‘Team Cape Town’, 
that pulled together to beat ‘Day Zero’.
The public
In all of the papers, there are references to ‘the public’, ‘citizens’, 
‘tax-payers’, ‘residents’ and ‘Capetonians’ that assume a unified 
whole, typically as a juxtaposition against the state (respectively, 
Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 2; Nhamo and Agyepong, 2019 
p. 5; Robins, 2019 p. 9; Scott et al., 2018 p. 9; Visser, 2018 p. 5). 
Furthermore, Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019), Robins (2019) and 
Visser (2018) distinguish between two opposing publics: the 
privileged and the disenfranchised, as well as a third public, the 
dissidents, who frame themselves as fighting on behalf of the 
disenfranchised.
Scott et al. (2018 p. 9) refers to the public as a whole feeling hard-
done-by because of stringent water-saving targets. Enqvist and 
Ziervogel (2019 p. 9) highlight this disgruntlement among the 
disenfranchised and interpret these perceptions as stemming 
from unmet expectations. Robins (2019 p. 17) is far critical about 
justice dimensions of the disenfranchised, characterising them as 
grossly neglected by the state: living in neighbourhoods flowing 
with raw sewage and in ‘shacks’ that regularly flood.
Robins (2019) uses this dramatic imagery to contrast the 
disenfranchised with the privileged public, whom he calls the 
‘middle class’, who complain about the ‘public disturbance’ in their 
‘otherwise orderly suburb’ caused by the general public flocking 
to a local spring (Robins 2019 p. 21). While Visser (2018 p. 4) 
characterises the privileged as benefitting society by spending 
their own income on unsubsidised water-saving devices, such 
as rainwater harvesting tanks and greywater recycling systems, 
Robins (2019 p. 12) interprets this behaviour as self-centred 
insulation against the water crisis, and presents framings of such 
behaviour as theft of ‘the community’s water’ (Robins, 2019 p. 12); 
opportunism ‘to go off grid’ (Robins, 2019 p. 14); and as the result 
of local government’s construction of a crisis in order to boost 
the businesses of their cronies (Robins, 2019 p. 13). The sense of 
indignation fuelled by such interpretations motivates the third 
type of a character within the public: the dissidents.
Dissidents and the groups they mobilise are present in the four Cape 
Town papers (Visser, 2018; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Robins, 
2019), but not in the Windhoek paper (Scott et al., 2018). Visser 
(2018, p. 4, 5) indicates that at least three dissident groups were 
formed to oppose a ‘drought charge’ (a fixed rates levy in addition 
to the usual water bill that the mayor argued was necessary to 
fund water augmentation infrastructure). The formation of such 
groups is also mentioned by Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019 p. 9), as 
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well as reference to groups opposing the quality of service delivery 
in informal settlements, the installation of water management 
devices, and what one dissident group calls the ‘privatisation of 
water’: that is, water bills. The latter group is also mentioned by 
Nhamo and Agyepong (2019 p. 8) for demanding an investigation 
into Cape Town government’s tenders for water-saving devices. 
This group is in fact a key subject of Robins’ (2019) paper.
Robins’ (2019 p. 3) paper focuses primarily on a dissident group 
that frames itself as opposing the ‘privatisation of water’, including 
the domestic installation of water management devices, building 
water augmentation plants and billing for domestic water use 
(Robins, 2019 p. 6). The group is not above inciting violence 
to these ends, even against government employees (Robins, 
2019 p. 11, 22). In fact, the group threatens to use ‘mass action’ 
to overthrow local government if their demands are not met 
(Robins, 2019 p. 16). These demands were laid out in a petition 
that claims that ‘The City used a formula that assumed it would 
not rain’ to artificially construct Day Zero in order to privatise 
water. The petition is framed as opposing water privatisation, 
but includes demands such as clearing alien vegetation from the 
catchment dams and forcing commercial agriculture to adopt 
water-smart technology (Robins, 2019 p. 13). The petition never 
gained critical mass, however. The group’s march on Parliament 
was only supported by a few hundred members, and had to be 
coordinated with a march by a branch of the national trade union 
to swell the crowd to a few thousand (Robins, 2019 p. 26).
A leadership figure in this group is the key character in Robins’ (2019 
p. 3) paper: an individual who calls himself the ‘Water Master’. His 
outpost is a natural spring in one of Cape Town’s suburbs. Although 
he lives in a different part of town, the ‘Water Master’ claims to have 
grown up in this neighbourhood. The self-designated mandate of 
the ‘Water Master’ is to maintain order in the cul-de-sac leading 
to the spring, which he does by building stanchions out of rope, 
writing signs to dictate behaviour at the spring, and directing the 
water with old gutters (Robins 2019 p. 19, 22). He also starts a 
WhatsApp group in which he fabricates stories (for example, that 
local government plans to charge for the use of the spring) and 
propagates inciting narratives that frame local water regulations as 
‘attacks’ on citizens, the crisis as ‘an artificial scarcity’ and demand 
management as ‘anti-poor’ (Robins, 2019 p. 15, 16).
The ‘Water Master’ acts as if the local councillor, whose official 
mandate is maintaining order in this cul-de-sac, is his arch 
rival. Local residents, for example, appeal to the councillor to 
do something about the filth, noise, congestion and defecation 
resulting from the crowds collecting water. The ‘Water Master’, 
however, denies this state of affairs, and accuses the local 
councillor of ‘inciting’ residents to oppose public access to the 
spring (Robins, 2019 p. 21, 22). Furthermore, the ‘Water Master’, 
attempts to dictate to the local councillor which upgrades ought 
to be performed in the cul-de-sac (such as ‘improving the 
lighting, widening and resurfacing the road and installing security 
cameras’) (Robins, 2019 p. 25), so he is enraged when the local 
council performs upgrades not to his specifications. Thus, when 
the local council introduces a police booth to maintain order while 
they construct a durable reticulation system to pipe the spring 
water into a more accessible public space a little distance away, 
the ‘Water Master’ frames these actions as racist on his WhatsApp 
group (Robins, 2019 p. 25). Robins’ (2019) paper concludes with 
the cul-de-sac once again quiet, and the ‘Water Master’ and his 
group framing themselves as victims of a hegemonic state.
The media
Multiple characterisations are applied to the media across four of 
the papers. Only in Nhamo and Agyepong (2019) is the media not 
one of the characters. Scott et al. (2018 p. 9) and Visser (2018 p. 7) 
adopt a relatively simple characterisation of popular media as 
watchdog of the state, but reference only ‘the press’ or ‘newspapers’, 
respectively, without specifying whether local or international 
newspapers are being referred to. Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019 
p. 8) characterise the ‘local and international media’ and simply 
‘media’ as inciting panic through exaggerated doomsday scenarios 
(and they cite the New York Times in their opening sentence, p. 1). 
Robins (2019) adopts these characterisations too, initially using 
a generalised reference to ‘the mainstream media’, but in a later 
reference specifies various press, news and broadcasting networks 
and magazines that reported on the crisis. Robins (2019) alone 
evolves the media’s character to reveal multiple, complex facets, 
which will be discussed further in this section.
Robins (2019) and Enqvist and Ziervogel (2019) characterise the 
media as a doomsayer: grossly exaggerating events and predicting 
worst-case scenarios. For example, the media compares Day Zero 
with World War II, September 11 (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 
p. 1), and the apocalypse (Robins, 2019 p. 6). Such framings are 
a double-edged sword; seeming to generate panic (Enqvist and 
Ziervogel, 2019 p. 8; Robins, 2019 p. 6), but also conveying the 
sense of urgency needed to motivate the public to reduce their 
water consumption. (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019 p. 8, 10). Enqvist 
and Ziervogel (2019) adopt only this doomsayer characterisation 
of the media, but Robins (2019) alone presents yet another, third 
characterisation: naivety.
Robins (2019) alone characterises the media as naive. For example, 
Robins (2019) begins with local and international media reports 
framing the water crisis as ‘the great leveller’, causing privileged 
and disenfranchised South Africans to suffer equally (Robins, 
2019 p. 6). Robins (2019 p. 21) also highlights the naivety of 
popular media’s focus on technological solutions, even solutions 
as absurd as towing icebergs from Antarctica.
Over the course of the narrative, Robins’ (2019 p. 18) media 
evolves into a more authoritative watchdog, holding the privileged 
‘middle classes’ accountable for using a greater proportion of the 
water supply than do the disenfranchised. Scott et al. (2018 p. 9) 
characterise the media as holding the state accountable for not 
being sufficiently proactive to avert a crisis. Visser’s (2018 p. 2) 
media is the mouthpiece of numerous ‘Water Prophets’ who 
for decades had been predicting water scarcity in Cape Town. 
Visser’s (2018 p. 4) media also accuse the state of not ‘doing 
their homework’ regarding the cost of water augmentation 
infrastructure. Scott et al. (2018) and Visser (2018) present only 
this ‘watchdog’ characterisation of the media. Robins (2019) 
however, presents additional facets to this character.
The Cape Town papers reveal tension between the media and the 
state, with the media at times insinuating accusations or making 
direct false allegations against local government. Robins’ (2019, 
19) media suggests that Day Zero was a fabrication when it accuses 
the state of ‘quietly’ moving Day Zero back to 2019 (Robins 2019 
p. 19), allegedly to present itself well in lieu of the imminent 
elections (Robins 2019 p. 11). Furthermore, ‘media reports’ 
directly attack government, falsely accusing the premier of the 
Western Cape of wasting water, forcing the premier to present her 
greasy hair and dusty car as symbols of her austerity (Robins, 2019 
p. 4). A councillor in Cape Town accuses ‘fake news’ articles such 
as these, as well as the ‘conspiracy theories’ that were rife on social 
media, for interfering with the state’s messaging for their water-
saving campaign (Robins, 2019 p. 14).
DISCUSSION
Narrative analysis deconstructs a text to expose implicit plotlines 
and characterisations (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016; Gergen, 1985). 
The present study adopts narrative analysis to expose which are 
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the main characters in academic papers on African cities’ water 
crises, what the narratives of these characters are and whether the 
papers characterise them as a villain, victim or hero.
With the exception of Nhamo and Agyepong (2019), who do 
not characterise the media, the main types of characters in the 
selected papers are the state (municipal, local and national 
government), the public (the privileged, the disenfranchised 
and the dissidents), and the media (digital and print media 
from local and international press and magazines). Enqvist and 
Ziervogel (2019) and Robins (2019) focus primarily on conflict 
between local government and dissidents from civil society, while 
Nhamo and Agyepong (2019), Scott et al. (2018) and Visser 
(2018) focus primarily on conflict between local and national 
government. The protagonist, or ‘hero’ character in four of the five 
papers (Robins, 2019 being the exclusion) is local government. 
Environmental factors, namely lack of rainfall, present the 
inciting incident that launches local government on a quest to 
restore stasis, namely adequate water provision to the populace. 
Key challenges along the way include dissent from sections of the 
‘public’, conflict with national government and, in Cape Town, 
betrayal by same-party provincial government. In these four 
papers, local government, although the protagonist, is presented 
as a vulnerable and misunderstood character, with pure motives. 
Vulnerability, however, requires careful assessment in particular 
delineating those instances where structural and historical factors 
embedded in the ‘system’ configure vulnerabilities and those that 
are the product (or outcomes) of the so called ‘crises’. Ensuring 
that this complex mix of vulnerabilities is captured and then 
communicated is extremely difficult but can influence and sway 
the trajectory of the overall narratives that are produced in times 
of acute scarcity.
The press in all five papers is presented more-or-less as a unified 
entity that variously sensationalises the drought, holds public 
figures accountable (and at times may misrepresent such figures) 
and emphasises and politicises socio-economic division in 
society. Although brief distinctions are made regarding the type of 
press, such as local and international press or online sources, the 
nature of influence by different types of media is not interrogated 
in the papers that were reviewed. Notwithstanding the presence 
of characters such as the press, the plot in all five papers is 
driven primarily by conflict between local government, national 
government and dissidents from civil society.
The five papers differ in their ending. Scott et al.’s (2018) paper 
has a deus ex machina ending, with funding arriving from 
national government at the eleventh hour, while the Cape Town 
papers have a tragic ending. Those with local government as 
the protagonist conclude with the state being misunderstood 
and maligned by the public whom it believes it has ‘saved’ from 
crisis (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Nhamo and Agyepong, 
2019), or with local government fractured and in conflict within 
itself (Visser, 2018). Alternatively, although local government is 
the villain in Robins’ (2019) paper, it is presented as victorious 
in maintaining its hegemonic power, with the hero, the ‘Water 
Master’, representing the dissidents, having failed to win control 
of a public water spring.
Robins (2019) is the only paper of the five that frames local 
water authorities as the villain and the public as the hero. This 
characterisation of the tragic hero being the disenfranchised, and 
the state the victorious villain, is consistent with seminal research 
on water narratives, such as Mehta (2003), that aims to expose 
profiteering in water infrastructure projects that are framed by 
public authorities as necessary for public wellbeing.
Robins’ (2019) ‘Water Master’ fulfils a Robin-Hood role: 
attempting to take back a natural spring from the rich and give it 
to the poor. By critically engaging with Robins’ (2019) paper, the 
present study exposes a tangle of contradictions in the narrative 
of this main character. For example, some of the key complaints 
that the ‘Water Master’ and his group levelled against local 
government (such as clearing alien vegetation from supply dams 
and making commercial agriculture more water wise) are the 
mandates of national government, but national government’s role 
in the crisis is not mentioned by the dissidents in Robins’ (2019) 
paper. The most likely explanation is because of the collaborations 
the Water Master’s group had with trade unionists allied to 
national government and opposed to local government in Cape 
Town (Nhamo and Agyepong, 2019 p. 8).
Furthermore, the ‘Water Master’ frames himself as serving the 
public by channelling the spring water with gutters to make 
it accessible to more people and keeping the peace by policing 
the crowds gathering water. He also hosts inciting content on 
his WhatsApp group promoting physical violence, mass action 
and overthrowing local government. However, when the local 
government pipes the spring water to a more accessible public 
space, and polices the crowds at the spring, the ‘Water Master’ 
frames these actions as racist and oppressive towards the poor. 
When the councillor attends to residents’ concerns, the ‘Water 
Master’ accuses him of inciting the local community to shut down 
the spring. Thus, Robins’ (2019) paper illustrates how dissonant 
narratives with political interests draw on familiar framings (in the 
case of the ‘Water Master’: racism, ‘white privilege’ and systematic 
oppression) in order to construct division in society and mistrust 
in official leadership during water crises (Rubin, 2010).
Enqvist and Ziervogel’s (2019) story is also played out primarily 
through conflict between local government and dissidents, but 
local government is the protagonist who becomes victimised by 
severe public backlash by dissident groups and panic-inducing 
media framings. Furthermore, Nhamo and Agyepong (2019) 
provide deeper insight into the contestation from the oppositional 
party ruling national government, who, notwithstanding their 
own role in exacerbating Cape Town’s water crisis, actively drive a 
narrative framing the water crisis as a failure of local government 
in Cape Town. These story structures are echoes of Kaika’s (2003) 
seminal case-study on Athens’ 1989–1991 water crisis, which 
shows how narratives can be used strategically during water crises 
to destabilise trust in public authorities. Research on the use of 
such ‘weaponised narratives’ (Hendricks and Verstergaard, 2019) 
is extremely limited in the field of water crisis narratives, but, in 
the African context, is better researched on the subject of election 
campaigns, which highlight the potential for media sensationalism 
to destabilise society (Maweu, 2017). Furthermore, narratives 
may be deliberately ‘weaponised’ (Hendricks and Verstergaard, 
2019) for the purpose of undermining trust in certain public 
authorities, as we see occurring in the behaviour of Robins’ ‘Water 
Master’ and the group he affiliates with. Sensationalism and the 
more deliberate weaponization of narratives, generates a stream of 
exaggerated and contradictory framings of an event, generating an 
atmosphere of panic and confusion (Hendricks and Verstergaard, 
2019; Maweu, 2017). The weaponised narrative may dominate the 
framing of the event, or may simply contribute to the confusion, 
but either way the end result is the erosion of trust in the water 
authority and a reduction of public buy-in to, and cooperation 
with, crisis-mitigating policies and technology (Kaika, 2003).
But why is it easy to generate subversive narratives in places like 
Kaika’s (2003) Athens, or Cape Town during the recent crisis? 
Perhaps it is because the seeds of discontent are co-located with 
the need for water. Kaika (2003) describes the bickering, closely-
packed low-income areas, where fears of water shortage drive 
neighbours to call the police on neighbours, while prodigal 
irrigation supports the luxuriant gardens of the wealthy ‘behind 
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closed doors’, so to speak, patrolled by private security guards. 
Athens at that time, during the drought, was also reeling from 
political turmoil, brought on by contestations for power between 
the socialist and capitalist parties (Kaika, 2003).
While doing away with economic divisions and political schisms 
may be an unrealistically ambitious recommendation, a solution 
lies in decoupling political marginalisation from economic 
marginalisation. An example of how this may be achieved is 
provided by South Africa’s National Drought Forum of the early 
1990s, which profiled the vulnerability of the country’s poor, 
incorporated notions of vulnerability into national legislation 
and, most importantly, brought civic society and trade unionists 
together with scientists and government (Vogel and Olivier, 2018). 
Had there existed a precedent of civic society and trade unions in 
continual communication with water authorities in Cape Town, 
actions such as the march on Parliament by these groups during 
the crisis would have been moot. Furthermore, the heightened 
levels of trust created by a legacy of cooperation would reduce the 
traction gained by weaponised narratives that flourished in Cape 
Town’s media during the recent crisis (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 
2016; Gosling, 2018; Hendricks and Verstergaard, 2019). Kenya’s 
leadership reacted to schism-inducing sensationalistic journalism 
by muzzling the press (Maweu, 2017). Political dissonance, hyped 
press and civic protests are, however, examples of democracy 
at work. To reduce schisms during crises, the solution is not 
to suppress the freedom of speech or hastily assemble token 
advisory groups, but rather to cultivate a longstanding tradition 
of participation in water governance by a broad spectrum of 
representatives from civil society (Vogel and Olivier, 2018). 
Investing in trust during the good years reduces the seedbed of 
discontent that flourishes during times of crisis.
CONCLUSION
The intention of this research is to highlight the implicit and 
unquestioned framings of African water crises in the academic 
literature in order to highlight how future research may contribute 
to a more nuanced perception of water crisis narratives, thereby 
facilitating water crisis governance with greater insight into the 
role of narratives in water governance; a field that is currently 
dominated by policy- and infrastructure-led approaches.
One key finding of the present paper is just how small and recent 
the body of scholarship is on water crisis narratives in Africa. Of 
a population of 4 281 texts from 11 databases, only five deal with 
this subject matter, and have all been published within the past 
two years of the present paper being written. These papers were 
written mere months after the crisis abated, or even during the 
throes of the crisis (cf. Visser, 2018). Furthermore, among these 
five papers, only two African cities are studied; Windhoek and 
Cape Town.
The second key finding shows, however, the considerable depth 
of insight that this handful of papers contribute to a small and 
emerging field of research. Notwithstanding the limited size, scope 
and age of this population of papers on water crisis narratives in 
Africa, the five texts show a degree of critical engagement and 
nuance given to the subject matter that is promising. The field 
of water crisis narratives is itself recent and limited. Seminal 
works such as Kaika (2003) and Mehta (2003), frame conflict in 
water crisis narratives as occurring primarily between tiers of 
government and between water authorities and disenfranchised 
segments of the population.
The papers under review appeared primarily to adopt this 
framing. Broadly, the papers made distinctions between tiers of 
government and highlighted contestation between these tiers, as 
well as different publics (the disenfranchised, the privileged and 
the dissidents); scholarship still appears to reflect the character-
isation adopted by seminal works on water crisis narratives (c.f. 
Mehta, 2003; Kaika, 2003) that highlight contestation between 
broad typologies of the state and the public. What is promising, 
however, is that whereas Robins (2019) mirrors the framing of the 
state as monolithic and exploitative of disenfranchised publics, 
his text presents a more nuanced interpretation of the main 
characters, revealing skirmishes within neighbourhoods and 
political parties and between socio-economic groups and tiers of 
government. Furthermore, the remaining four papers break away 
from ‘traditional’ framings of the state as hegemonic to represent 
local government as ‘doing its best’, but being misunderstood 
or misrepresented by dissidents, the press and other tiers of 
government. They also highlight the actions taken by minor 
characters, such as residents, farmers and academics, to mitigate 
the crisis, respectively through private spending on alternative 
domestic water supplies (bore-holes and rainwater collection), 
donating agricultural water to the municipal supply dams, and 
providing an advisory role to local government.
What is noticeable about the reviewed papers, however, is 
the predominance of a conflict framing, in which the main 
characters contest how management of the crisis is framed. Such 
framings may represent a certain facet of events, but obfuscate 
the cooperation that is occurring, and which contributes to 
mitigating the crisis. The prevalence of conflict framing is an 
artifact of narratives (consistent with the truism that there is no 
story without conflict) (Propp, 1958). While conflict framings 
are necessary for highlighting failures of governance and human 
rights abuses, cooperation framings have a role to play in finding 
what is working, in terms of water crisis mitigation, and exploring 
those potentials.
Furthermore, as suggested by broader research on the influence of 
the press on framing public perceptions during African elections, 
and more specifically, the work of Kaika (2003) that highlights 
the press’s power to frame public perceptions of water crises, 
the reviewed papers include scant reflection on the agency and 
influence of the press on framing narratives on water crises in the 
African context.
Our intention in writing this paper has been to expand on the field 
of scholarship that uses narrative analysis to expose the ‘story’ in 
the subtext of ‘dispassionate’ texts (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2016). 
By selecting academic texts on water narratives from African 
contexts, our findings showed that the same actors may be 
presented variously as villains, victims or heroes, depending on 
the perspective of the various papers’ authors. Thus, while we may 
regard ourselves as scientists, when we communicate our research, 
we become storytellers, and in our stories, we chose whose interest 
to promote and whose to vilify. May we adopt the same reflexivity 
towards the construction of the ‘story’ in the subtext of our papers 
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